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CLASS DISMISSED: COMPELLING A LOOK AT 
JURISPRUDENCE SURROUNDING CLASS ARBITRATION AND 




Every Thanksgiving season—after the family stuffs itself with a tur-
key that itself had only been stuffed a few hours beforehand—my mother 
and I satiate our inner shopaholic with some Black Friday bargain hunting. 
Last year was no exception. However, rather than purchasing each family 
member a few tchotchkes we would find while window shopping, this year 
featured us braving long lines, shiny signage, and the occasional shopping 
cart crash at Costco. After years of suffering at the hands of our “dumb” 
LG slide phones, we decided to equip the family with the latest Lyft-hailing 
and Snapchat-posting smartphone swag from that one company’s newly 
minted inventory. I think their logo is a pear? No! An orange. I forget . . .
With Costco poised as our Black Friday Olympiad’s closing ceremo-
ny, I expected to walk into a store that had devolved into a consumer-
themed Hunger Games. A short line in front of the kiosk initially raised my 
spirits, but my hopes were short-lived, as the gentleman directly in front of 
us whined that he had been standing there for hours. Glancing past his 
shoulder, I understood why: each transaction was a mini treaty negotiation 
that consisted of selecting a phone, finding the perfectly colored protective 
Otterbox in which to encase one’s purchases, signing and initialing con-
tracts, orally accepting said contracts by phone, printing and signing re-
ceipts, and receiving triplicate copies of everything. No wonder the line 
was short. This wasn’t The Hunger Games; this was a live-action version of 
The Oregon Trail—everyone else had died of dysentery.
Finally, we reached the salesperson. “Which provider does your fami-
ly use?” AT&T, we informed her. She opened a drawer and withdrew sev-
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eral stapled packets that radiated a contractual aura. My law-school skills 
primed, I shoved the papers off to my mother for her signature, and in-
quired about the phone number I needed to dial to orally accept the new 
contractual terms. The salesperson gave me a slip of paper, and I thumbed 
in the digits on my phone. The familiar AT&T tone greeted me, followed 
by an automated voice. “Welcome to the AT&T wireless contract menu. 
Para español, oprima el dos . . . if you’re here to accept the terms of your 
new AT&T wireless contract, press one.” BEEP. “Great! Please listen to 
the following recording, as it describes important components of your new 
wireless contract. Your new wireless device number is (384) 791-4 . . .”
My mind glazed over, and I became entranced in the nearest 4K TV’s 
broadcast of a bark-colored chameleon hunting its prey. Just as the reptile 
whipped out its tongue at a languishing fly, the automated recording shrilly 
pierced my eardrum. “Please note that by accepting this contract, you agree 
to AT&T’s method of dispute resolution, which includes a mandatory arbi-
tration provision. To accept these terms, press one. To repeat—” BEEP.
Though flawed in many respects, the class action mechanism accords 
litigants a balance between justice and efficiency.1 Theoretically, both 
plaintiffs and defendants benefit. For the former, class actions aggregate 
individuals’ claims and—perhaps more importantly—pool financial re-
sources under one lawsuit.2 Rather than burdening one named representa-
tive with paying for a litany of experts and steep court costs, law firms 
initially bankroll class litigation, and then pocket a portion of a settlement 
or judgment’s proceeds to cover costs before distributing the remainder 
amongst claimants.3 This claim-aggregation synergy converges financial 
inequities between claimants and commercial defendants. On the flipside, a 
court that grants defendants a settlement, motion for summary judgment, or 
judgment on the merits curtails those defendants’ long-term risk exposure 
from individual suits.4 Effectively, class actions possess the proverbial 
power to kill dozens of birds (potential plaintiffs) with one, preclusive 
stone (an order or settlement agreement).5
1. RICHARD L. MARCUS ET AL., COMPLEX LITIGATION: CASES AND MATERIALS ON ADVANCED 
CIVIL PROCEDURE 7 (5th ed. 2010).
2. Id. at 224–25.
3. Id. at 579, 581; In re Cardinal Health, Inc. ERISA Litigation, 225 F.R.D. 552, 555 (S.D. Ohio 
2005).
4. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 782.
5. Id.
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A. The Growth of Alternative Dispute Resolution
The past thirty years have played host to an unprecedented prolifera-
tion of quasi-privatized forms of alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”).6
Part of this growth stems from the United States Supreme Court’s shifting 
outlook on ADR; whereas the Court once carried a disdain for arbitration 
much like Dr. Frankenstein did his humanoid, by the end of the twentieth 
century, the Court scrutinized the process with more measured glance.7 In
1984, the Burger Court buried the antiquated notion that ADR did not ad-
judicate parties’ legal rights, and championed a “national policy favoring 
arbitration.”8
Parties flocked to mediations and arbitrations, keen to take advantage 
of their informal, efficient, and economical services.9 Why not, after all? If 
those parties can avoid the bureaucratic nightmare of a lumbering court 
system with a faster and cheaper alternative, then more power to them! 
Many bought into this mantra; between 1997 and 2002, arbitrations dou-
bled in frequency, and demand for the entire suite of ADR services more 
than quadrupled.10 The commercial world was no exception: noticing eve-
ryone else strutting in Jordans, the Converse-wearing corporations swiftly 
fitted pre-dispute arbitration provisions in many of their standard form 
contracts distributed to consumers, shareholders, and employees.11
Businesses incorporated pre-dispute arbitration clauses into their con-
tracts believing that those clauses would provide for individual dispute 
resolution with aggrieved claimants.12 However, plaintiffs who signed such 
clauses (or their attorneys, at least) saw litigation’s tectonics shifting, and 
sought to bring the benefits of suing as a class into arbitration’s auspices. 
They unconventionally amalgamated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 2313
6. Thomas Stipanowich, ADR and the ‘Vanishing Trial’: The Growth and Impact of ‘Alternative 
Dispute Resolution’, 1 J. EMPIRICAL LEGAL STUD. 843, 872 (2004) (delineating that growth of ADR 
has exploded within a decade’s time).
7. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 7–8 (1984).
8. Id. at 10.
9. Stipanowich, supra note 6, at 872.
10. Id. at 872 tbl.13.
11. Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, Beware the Fine Print Part 1: Arbitration 





12. See generally AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333 (2011); Oxford Health Plans 
LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest. 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 
(2013).
13. FED R. CIV. P. 23.
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with the Federal Arbitration Act’s (“FAA”) provision requiring arbitration 
clause’s enforcement,14 and created a new type of proceeding: class arbitra-
tion, a class action conducted within an arbitration proceeding’s confines.
The commercial sector did not warm to this untested novelty, and vig-
orously asserted that arbitration clauses were for mano-a-mano dispute
resolution.15 Certain courts interpreted these clauses as allowing class arbi-
tration.16 Others did not.17 Eventually, these circuit-splitting lawsuits 
wound their way up the appellate channels to the U.S. Supreme Court.18
B. Litigation Concerning Arbitration Clauses and Class Arbitration
The Court considered class arbitration’s efficacy in a series of cases 
starting with Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.19 Over a decade, the 
justices methodically sculpted class arbitration’s creeping tendrils, allowing 
certain cases to bloom into full-blown, private class arbitrations or public 
class actions, while pruning others to individual ADR proceedings.20 The 
Court continued this case-by-case analysis until its splintered decision in 
AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, in which a five-justice majority con-
cluded that the Federal Arbitration Act virtually preempted class arbitra-
tions’ formation.21 Despite repeated challenges to its central holding—
including an opinion in late 201522 and a recently-argued case in October 
201723—Concepcion remains largely unaltered.
Claimants who wish to aggregate their claims into a class arbitration 
face a Sisyphean task.24 Often, these parties—most of them consumers and 
14. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
15. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 444–45 (2003).
16. Brennan v. ACE INA Holdings, Inc., 2002 WL 1804918, at *3 (E.D. Pa. 2002).
17. Champ v. Siegel Trading Co., Inc. 55 F.3d 269, 274 (7th Cir. 1995).
18. See Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 444; Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
130 S. Ct. 1758, 1765 (2010); AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 338 (2011); Oxford 
Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2066 (2013); Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 
S. Ct. 2306, 2308 (2013).
19. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 444.
20. Compare Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct at 1765 with Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2070–71.
21. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 340. The Court did not categorically preempt all forms of class
arbitration, as seen by its holding in Oxford. 133 S. Ct. at 2070–71. Moreover, questions linger as to 
whether congressional grants to agencies like the Consumer Finance Protection Bureau under legisla-
tion like the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform Act allow those agencies to render contract provisions 
requiring individual arbitration unenforceable. See generally Part IV, infra.
22. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 464 (2015).
23. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-285, 
2017 WL 125664 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017).
24. First, for those contracts that offer them, claimants would have to recognize that the arbitra-
tion provision they sign have an “opt out” clause which the claimants could exercise to forego arbitra-
tion altogether. However, because most claimants are not aware their contracts provide for such an opt-
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employees—contractually bound themselves to pre-dispute arbitration and 
simultaneously waived their rights to aggregate their claims in a class ac-
tion or class arbitration.25 For people who allege large-value claims and 
have enough funds to hire an attorney and experts, such an agreement poses 
no significant threat. The parties submit their dispute to an arbitrator, who 
expeditiously reaches a decision.26
Yet, when these two contract provisions (the class action waiver and 
arbitration provision) couple together in so-called “negative value” suits, 
the result pits individual claimants with scarce resources against a wealthier 
opponent and strips claimants of their pursuit of valid albeit low-value 
claims against commercial defendants.27 Often, the costs those claimants 
must incur in individual arbitration overtake a paltry damages award’s ben-
efits.28 And while ordinary litigation allows plaintiffs to circumvent such 
an economic barrier by banding together with others as a class to take ad-
vantage of pooled resources or a common fund doctrine, both the agree-
ment to arbitrate and the class waiver prevent claim aggregation.29 In this 
way, a commercial entity can cloister itself away from significant financial 
liability, as well as any correlative damages award meant to deter unsavory 
behavior.
Academia has largely criticized the policy points30 purported by Con-
cepcion’s majority.31 Some scholars proclaim an apocalyptic fallout, fear-
ing that commercial parties might use class waivers and arbitration clauses 
to undo collective actions allowable under legislative pillars like the Envi-
ronmental Protection Act, National Labor Relations Act, and Sherman 
out, many individuals’ options whittle down to either hoping their arbitration provision provides for an 
Oxford scenario, or their potential grievance falls under some statute that shows a clear intent to forego 
the FAA’s permission of arbitration, like Dodd-Frank. See Part III(c), infra.
25. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2308 (2013).
26. See STEPHEN C. YEAZELL, CIVIL PROCEDURE 555–58 (8th ed. 2012).
27. MARCUS ET AL., supra note 1, at 222.
28. Id.
29. P. Christine Deuelle & Corey Berman, The Future of Class Arbitration: Recent Supreme 
Court Jurisprudence on Arbitration Clauses Interpretation and Enforceability, CLASS ACTION 
MONITOR, at 1 (July 23, 2013), 
http://www.weil.com/~/media/files/pdfs/Weil_Summer_2013_Class_Action_Monitor.pdf 
[https://perma.cc/9Y79-VBC4].
30. Concepcion denoted well-established policy reasons for disallowing class arbitration. These 
include arbitration’s intended efficiency and informality, as well as the risk class arbitration carries for 
defendants with its lack of appellate review. Another rationale may include parties’ freedom to contract 
amongst one another. 563 U.S. 333, 348–51.
31. See Brian Fitzpatrick, The End of Class Actions?, 57 ARIZ. L. REV. 161, 174 (2015) (noting 
that “class actions are headed for demise[.]”).
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Act.32 Other organizations rebuff these claims through empirical studies 
that show individual arbitration benefits claimants more than traditional 
litigation. Recently, media outlets have caught wind of Concepcion’s long-
term, disparate effects, and have reported on the practical consequences 
that may ensue if the Court’s holding goes unaltered.33 To stymie class 
actions’ preemption, agencies like the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau (“CFPB”) have attempted to introduce regulations that would give 
certain plaintiffs an attempt to sue as a class before a business can compel 
individual arbitration. But these agencies’ efforts remain constricted by 
regulatory boundaries and sinusoidal political winds.34
This Note addresses the issues surrounding arbitration provisions, 
class action waivers, and the problems that crop up when these provisions 
are used together in a contract. Part II outlines the current jurisprudential 
climate that courts have created regarding class arbitration’s permissive-
ness and proscription in non-court proceedings. In Part III, the Note ana-
lyzes the problems associated with the U.S. Supreme Court’s current stance 
on class arbitration, chiefly the obstacles claimants face when they sue a 
business and try to aggregate their claims into a class action. The Note’s 
conclusion echoes concerns that arbitration clauses effectively foreclose on 
class action rights where such rights are not statutorily protected. Part IV 
posits various ways in which Congress can reform the problematic system. 
Finally, Part V briefly concludes.
32. See, e.g., id. at 199 (“[I]t will mean that businesses will have all but entirely insulated them-
selves from class action liability”) (citing Sarah R. Cole, On Babies and Bathwater: The Arbitration 
Fairness Act and the Supreme Court’s Recent Arbitration Jurisprudence, 48 HOUS. L. REV. 457, 467 
(2011) (“The Supreme Court’s recent decision in AT&T v. Concepcion . . . sounds the death knell for 
the class arbitration process.”); J. Maria Glover, Disappearing Claims and the Erosion of Substantive 
Law, 124 YALE L.J. 3052, 3052 (2015) (“While this shift from dispute resolution in courts—the public 
realm—to dispute resolution in arbitration—the private realm—initially undermined values and mecha-
nisms of adjudication, the shift from public lawsuits to private arbitration now also threatens values and 
mechanisms of lawmaking.”); Jean R. Sternlight, Tsunami: AT&T Mobility L.L.C. v. Concepcion 
Impedes Access to Justice, 90 OR. L. REV. 703, 704–07 (2012) (“It is highly ironic but no less distress-
ing that a case with a name meaning ‘conception’ should come to signify death for the legal claims of 
many potential plaintiffs.”).
33. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 348–51 (2011).
34. Not only do agencies only possess power to legislative or adjudicate on matters only within 
its scope or subject matter, but statues granting a certain agency such power may further narrow the 
scope that some of that rulemaking or adjudication can take. Take for example the powers of the CFPB 
to regulate agreements entered into between a consumer and a lender. See 12 U.S.C. § 5518(b) (2012) 
(“The [CFPB], by regulation, may prohibit or impose conditions or limitations on the use of an agree-
ment between a covered person and a consumer for a consumer financial product or service providing 
for arbitration of any future dispute between the parties, if the [CFPB] finds that such a prohibition or 
imposition of conditions or limitations is in the public interest and for the protection of consumers.”).
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II. GREEN[ER] PASTURES: A STATUTORY AND JURISPRUDENTIAL 
OVERVIEW OF CLASS ARBITRATION
A. The Federal Arbitration Act
Before it overviews class arbitration’s case law, Part II summarizes 
the pertinent sections of the Federal Arbitration Act and distinguishes sub-
stantive and procedural arbitrability. Congress enacted the FAA in 1925 to 
solidify ADR’s growing presence alongside traditional, court-centered 
dispute resolution.35 Courts have spilt much ink analyzing two of the 
FAA’s sections—section 2 and section 4—and how those sections apply to 
class arbitration. Section 2 addresses the validity of arbitration provisions, 
and provides:
a contract evidencing a transaction involving commerce to settle by arbi-
tration a controversy thereafter arising out of such contract or transac-
tion . . . or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an existing 
controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, shall be 
valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as exist at 
law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.36
As Chief Justice Rehnquist stated in simpler terms, arbitration is a 
matter of consent, not coercion.37 In turn, section 4 highlights a district 
court’s requirement to compel arbitration when one party to the contract 
tries to litigate an issue covered within the scope of that contract’s arbitra-
tion clause.38 The U.S. Supreme Court interprets this pair of sections in 
tandem to outline where it does and does not possess the power to review 
arbitral decisions.39
Substantive and procedural arbitrability are concepts that address 
which reviewer—a court or an arbitrator—possesses the power to decide an 
issue in arbitration. If a consumer alleges she is not bound by a contract’s 
arbitration clause, that consumer raises a question that concerns substantive
arbitrability, which is within courts’ purview to adjudicate.40 Additionally, 
courts decide whether an arbitration agreement is revocable based on legal 
35. Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 163 (“The FAA was enacted . . . to override judicial hostility to 
arbitration . . . .”).
36. 9 U.S.C. § 2 (2012).
37. Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 109 S. Ct. 1248, 
1250 (1989).
38. 9 U.S.C. § 4 (2012) (A court that is “satisfied that the making of the agreement for arbitration 
or the failure to comply therewith is not in issue . . . shall make an order directing the parties to proceed 
to arbitration in accordance with the terms of the agreement.”).
39. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 344, 351.
40. Green Tree Fin. Corp. v. Bazzle, 539 U.S. 444, 452–53 (2003).
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or equitable grounds.41 Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court presumes that 
parties intend arbitrators to decide disputes about the meaning of a particu-
lar procedure used in an arbitration, such as waiver, delay, or available 
defenses to arbitration.42
B. Beginnings: Green Tree and Stolt-Nielsen
The Supreme Court distinguished substantive arbitrability from proce-
dural arbitrability in Green Tree Financial Corp. v. Bazzle.43 The case fea-
tured a plaintiff couple who alleged that Green Tree had failed to provide 
them with a form explaining their legal rights in a loan transaction.44 The 
parties had entered into a contract containing a pre-dispute arbitration pro-
vision. When the couple sued and sought to certify a class, a state trial 
court certified that class, but simultaneously entered an order compelling 
class arbitration.45 An arbitrator later entered an award in favor of the arbi-
tral class.46
Four justices of the Supreme Court concluded that the question of 
whether a contract forbade class arbitration qualified as one of procedural 
arbitrability within an arbitrator’s adjudicative scope.47 The plurality rea-
soned that the question was not “whether [the parties] agreed to arbitrate 
the matter,” but instead focused on the “kind of arbitration proceeding” the 
parties had contracted.48 Nevertheless, the Court declined to opine on
whether silence in an arbitration clause permitted or foreclosed class arbi-
tration,49 an omission that left both plaintiffs and defendants perpetually 
perplexed.50 Neither side knew how to interpret a contract silent on the 
issue of class arbitration.
The Green Tree Court did suggest arbitration-precluding language that 
parties could include in their contractual agreements. For example, if a 
contract stated that disputes would be resolved by an arbitrator “selected by 
[Green Tree] to arbitrate this dispute and no other (even identical) dispute 
41. See id.
42. Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 130 S. Ct. 1758, 1775 (2010); BC Group PLC 
v. Republic of Argentina, 134 S. Ct. 1198, 1202 (2014).
43. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 444.
44. Id. at 448–49.
45. Id. at 449.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 451.
48. Id.
49. Id. at 447.
50. Ultimately, this irresolution precipitated the Court’s decisions in both Stolt Nielsen, and, more 
tangentially, Oxford Health Plans LLC. See generally Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Int’l Corp., 
130 S. Ct. 1758 (2010); Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064 (2013).
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with another [third party],” such language would prohibit class arbitra-
tion.51 Unsurprisingly, commercial entities used this dictum and refined 
their arbitration clauses to hinder class arbitration. But the holding’s ambi-
guity also caused many arbitrators to interpret Green Tree as generally 
permitting class arbitration. Indeed, by 2009 the American Arbitration As-
sociation (“AAA”) had certified nearly 300 such arbitrations.52
Stolt-Nielsen v. AnimalFeeds International Corp clarified the Court’s 
stance on class arbitration in two ways.53 First, it commanded a Court ma-
jority, rather than a mere plurality, thereby giving it greater precedential 
effect.54 Second, it squarely addressed contractual silence on class arbitra-
tion. The Court concluded that, under the FAA, claimants seeking to arbi-
trate as a class could not compel a defendant to do so if the contract they 
entered into was silent on the matter.55 The Court reiterated its dicta from a 
previous case56—noting that arbitration acts as a welcome and expeditious 
alternative to traditional courtroom litigation—but further expounded that 
the “basic precept that arbitration ‘is a matter of consent, not coercion,’” 
and that an arbitrator could not infer an implied agreement to arbitrate 
“solely from . . . the parties’ agreement to arbitrate.”57
Green Tree had framed the inquiry into party intent in the negative 
(i.e.—“did the parties restrict one another from class arbitration?”). Stolt-
Nielsen flipped this; now, arbitrators had to ask whether parties affirmative-
ly agreed to allow class arbitration.58 And while the Green Tree plurality 
provided contract language that would block class arbitration, the Stolt-
Neilsen majority failed to offer similar language that it would use to inter-
pret a contract as authorizing class arbitration.
As a matter of policy, the Court rationalized that an inference of con-
sent to class arbitration from mere silence tapered ADR’s efficient and 
informal spirit. Because class arbitrations would take longer and require 
more sophisticated procedures than individual dispute resolution, class 
arbitrations carried greater financial and temporal costs. The Court refused 
to burden a party that might not have agreed to such costs in a contract 
silent on class arbitration. “[I]t cannot be presumed,” Justice Alito wrote, 
51. Green Tree Fin. Corp., 539 U.S. at 451.
52. Deuelle & Berman, supra note 29, at 3.
53. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct at 1758–76.
54. Id. at 1763.
55. Id. at 1776.
56. See Southland Corp. v. Keating, 465 U.S. 1, 36 (1984) (O’Connor, J., dissenting).
57. Stolt-Nielsen, 130 S. Ct. at 1774, 1782 (quoting Volt Info. Scis., Inc. v. Bd. of Trustees of 
Leland Stanford Junior Univ., 109 S. Ct. 1248, 1250 (1989)).
58. Id. at 1775.
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“that the parties consented to [class arbitration] by simply agreeing to sub-
mit their disputes to an arbitrator.”59 Ultimately, the Court’s retreat from a 
presumption of class arbitration imposed a burden on parties to provide 
specific language allowing for the practice.60
C. Concepcion
The following October term, the Court resolved mounting friction be-
tween the FAA and state law when it issued its seminal holding in AT&T 
Mobility LLC v. Concepcion.61 There, a consumer moved to certify a puta-
tive class in federal district court after alleging that AT&T had engaged in 
deceptive advertising by claiming its cell phone plans featured free 
phones.62 While the fact pattern imitated Green Tree and Stolt-Nielsen (i.e. 
— a plaintiff brings a class action suit, and a lower court compels that 
plaintiff and the class maintainable to arbitration) Concepcion crucially 
differed from its antecedent cases. First, whereas Green Tree and Stolt-
Nielsen featured arbitration provisions silent on the subject of class arbitra-
tion, in Concepcion, the plaintiff had signed a pre-dispute contract with 
language that required him to submit to mandatory individual arbitration.63
Moreover, AT&T’s arbitration provision provided highly favorable terms 
to claimants; the company would pay all ADR costs (although not neces-
sarily the claimants’ attorney’s or expert’s fees), the arbitration would take 
place in the county where the consumer was located, the arbitrator was not 
limited in her possible damages award, and if the plaintiff received a larger 
award than AT&T’s last settlement offer, AT&T would raise its offer to 
$7,500 and would pay double attorney’s fees.64
The district court acknowledged the generous terms of AT&T’s provi-
sion; nevertheless, it held that precedent established in Discover Bank v. 
Superior Court65 prohibited unconscionable contracts of adhesion that 
permit a party to evade liability from “negative value” claims whose cost to 
litigate individually exceeds the expected damages award.66 The Ninth 
Circuit affirmed this holding. The U.S. Supreme Court, however, reversed, 
concluding Discover Bank violated the purpose of Section 2 of the FAA.67
59. Id.
60. Id. at 1776.
61. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 352 (2011).
62. Id. at 336–38.
63. Id. at 336.
64. Id.at 336–37.
65. Discover Bank v. Superior Court, 36 Cal.4th 148, 163 (Ct. App. 1st 2005).
66. Concepcion, 563 U.S. at 351–52.
67. Id. at 352.
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By permitting class arbitration in cases where a court deemed individual 
arbitration provisions unconscionable, Discover Bank allowed plaintiffs to 
sue a defendant and force that defendant to “bet the company with no effec-
tive means of review.”68
In so commenting, Justice Scalia referenced that courts review arbitral 
decisions only under narrow circumstances, such as fraud; thus, meaningful 
appellate review often was unavailable to scrutinize an adverse judgment 
against a party in class arbitration. The Court held that because the parties 
had not explicitly permitted class arbitration in their contract, and that the 
lower court “manufactured” a class arbitration under Discover Bank’s prec-
edent, the Ninth Circuit’s interpretation permitting class arbitration violated 
the FAA’s Section 2.69
The Concepcion majority advanced several policy points in support of 
its holding, including those rooted in arbitration’s informality and lack of 
appellate review.70 With respect to the former, the majority argued that 
class arbitration would shape-shift arbitral proceedings into a cumbersome 
quagmire like traditional litigation, bogged down in dense procedures, a 
parade of experts, and tremendous attorney’s fees.71 Under such a regime, 
arbitrators could not exercise procedures that resulted in “lower costs, 
greater efficiency and speed, and the ability to choose expert adjudicators 
to resolve specialized disputes.”72
The Court also intimated that if claimants forced businesses to defend 
class arbitration proceedings, those businesses would abandon arbitration 
provisions in their contracts completely.73 “[W]hen damages allegedly 
owed to tens of thousands of potential claimants are aggregated and decid-
ed at once, the risk of an error will often become unacceptable. Faced with 
even a small chance of a devastating loss, defendants will be pressured into
settling questionable claims.”74
68. Id. at 351.
69. Id. at 352.
70. Id. at 348–50.
71. Id. at 348–49.
72. Id. (“A cursory comparison of bilateral and class arbitration illustrates the difference. Accord-
ing to the American Arbitration Association (AAA), the average consumer arbitration between January 
and August 2007 resulted in a disposition on the merits in six months, four months if the arbitration was
conducted by documents only . . . As of September 2009, the AAA had opened 283 class arbitra-
tions . . . Not a single one, however, had resulted in a final award on the merits.”).
73. Id. at 350.
74. Id.
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D. Oxford and Italian Colors
Post-Concepcion, the Court positioned the FAA as a preemptive barri-
er against class arbitration. Two years later, though, the Court issued its 
unanimous opinion in Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, and threw a 
wrench into the past decade’s tightening precedent.75 A case that began 
pre-Stolt-Nielsen, Oxford featured a plaintiff physician who sought to certi-
fy a putative class against an insurance agency for breach of contract. Ox-
ford Health Plans (“Oxford”) moved to compel arbitration.76 The state 
court granted Oxford’s motion, and, once in arbitration, the parties agreed 
that “the arbitrator should decide whether their contract authorized class 
arbitration.”77 With that, the arbitrator concluded that the clause reflected 
the parties’ mutual intent to allow the physicians to proceed in class arbitra-
tion, reasoning that the parties sought to include in the arbitration proceed-
ings “everything that [was] prohibited from the court process.”78 He then 
entered an award for the plaintiffs’ class.
The Third Circuit rejected Oxford’s request to vacate the arbitrator’s 
judgment under the FAA’s Section 10(a)(4).79 On appeal, the U.S. Supreme 
Court upheld the Third Circuit’s decision, noted that Oxford carried a 
heavy burden of proof when attempting to vacate an arbitral award, and 
concluded that it had not met this burden.80 Thus, regardless of the arbitral 
decision’s deficiencies, the court had to uphold it.81 The unanimous Court 
also reiterated its distinction between “substantive” and “procedural” arbi-
trability, opining that, had Oxford argued that the availability of class arbi-
tration was a “question of arbitrability,” the company would have framed 
such an issue as one of substantive arbitrability reviewable by courts de
novo.82 However, because Oxford and the plaintiff physician agreed to let 
the arbitrator decide whether the arbitration agreement permitted a class 
option, the Court could not tackle the substantive arbitrability question.83
Unlike Stolt-Nielsen, where both parties admitted that they had not 
reached an agreement concerning class arbitration, in Oxford, the Court 
found no such admission, and the arbitrator—wielding the power conferred 
75. Oxford Health Plans LLC v. Sutter, 133 S. Ct. 2064, 2071 (2013).
76. Id. at 2067. 
77. Id.
78. Id.
79. 9 U.S.C. § 10(a)(4) (2012).
80. Oxford Health Plans, 133 S. Ct. at 2068. 
81. Id. at 2069.
82. Id.
83. Id. at 2068–69 n.2.
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upon him by the parties—validly “construe[d] the contract . . . and did find 
an agreement to permit class arbitration.”84 The Court summarized that 
when the parties agreed to let an arbitrator decide the presence or absence 
of a class arbitration provision in their contract “an arbitrator’s error—even 
his grave error—is not enough” for the court to overturn his decision.85
Biting at Oxford’s heels a week and a half later, the Court handed 
down its decision in American Express Co. v. Italian Colors Restaurant.86
If Oxford threw a rope over for plaintiffs to surmount Concepcion’s 
preemptive wall, Italian Colors added spikes to the wall’s top plate. The 
question presented concerned “[w]hether the Federal Arbitration Act per-
mits courts . . . to invalidate arbitration agreements on the ground that they 
do not permit class arbitration of a federal-law claim.”87 A plaintiff restau-
rateur alleged a negative value antitrust claim88 against American Express 
(“AmEx”) and, despite a class waiver clause, filed a putative, federal class 
action against the credit card company that asserted it had violated the 
Sherman Act. The Second Circuit reversed a grant of AmEx’s request to 
compel arbitration; the appellate court concluded that expert witness costs 
impeded the plaintiff’s ability to assert his statutory rights under the Sher-
man Act individually, and that class arbitration served as the only means by 
which the plaintiff (and other class members) could pay for such an expert 
while continuing to pursue his claim.89 Additionally, AmEx’s arbitration 
terms were not as generous as AT&T’s, which allowed the plaintiff to 
claim that the contract he had entered into prevented his pursuit of an alleg-
edly valid claim against AmEx.90
84. Id. at 2070.
85. Id.
86. Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013).
87. Id. at 2308.
88. “In resisting the motion, respondents submitted a declaration from an economist who estimat-
ed that the cost of an expert analysis necessary to prove the antitrust claims would be ‘at least several 
hundred thousand dollars, and might exceed $1 million,” while the maximum recovery for an individual 
plaintiff would be $12,850, or $38,549 when trebled.” Id.
89. Id.
90. Compare AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336–37 (2011) (In the event the 
parties proceed to arbitration, the agreement specifies that AT&T must pay all costs for non-frivolous 
claims; that arbitration must take place in the county in which the customer is billed; that, for claims of 
$10,000 or less, the customer may choose whether the arbitration proceeds in person, by telephone, or
based only on submissions; that either party may bring a claim in small claims court in lieu of arbitra-
tion; and that the arbitrator may award any form of individual relief, including injunctions and presum-
ably punitive damages.), with Brief for Respondent at 42–44, Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 
133 S. Ct. 2304 (2013) (No. 12-133) (Moreover, the plaintiffs in Concepcion . . . would be able to 
vindicate those claims. Under the distinctive pro-consumer features of AT&T Mobility’s arbitration 
clause, ‘aggrieved customers who filed claims would be ‘essentially guarantee[d]’ to be made whole,’
making the claims at issue ‘most unlikely to go unresolved.’ . . . If Petitioners’ arbitration clause con-
tained such pro-vindication clauses, Respondents would not be here.”).
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The Supreme Court considered whether the FAA’s mandate to inter-
pret parties’ arbitration agreements by their express terms overrode the 
plaintiff’s allegation that the contract undermined his abilities to seek re-
dress under the Sherman Act. The plaintiff raised an exception in the FAA 
that invalidates arbitration agreements when they prevent the “effective 
vindication” of statutorily granted rights; because each class member as-
serted a “negative value” claim, those members could not effectively bring 
their claims without the class action mechanism.91 Indeed, Justice Breyer 
addressed this point in Concepcion when he wrote, “[w]hat rational lawyer 
would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the 
possibility of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”92
However, penning the majority opinion, Justice Scalia wrote that “the 
antitrust laws [neither] guarantee an affordable procedural path to the vin-
dication of every claim,” nor “evince an intention to preclude a waiver” of 
class procedures. “[T]he fact that it is not worth the expense involved in 
proving a statutory remedy,” Scalia continued, “does not constitute the 
elimination of the right to pursue that remedy.”93 In the end, the justices 
divided along a similar, ideological schism as they had in Concepcion, with 
the majority holding the FAA does not permit courts to invalidate clauses 
that mandate individual arbitration.94
E. Imburgia and Epic Systems
DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia grappled with a far less groundbreaking 
issue than either Concepcion or Italian Colors. Here, the parties entered 
into a contract containing an arbitration clause and class waiver before the 
Court considered Concepcion.95 The clause noted both that the FAA gov-
erned the arbitration provision, and “that if the ‘law of your state’ makes 
the waiver of class arbitration unenforceable, then the entire arbitration 
provision is unenforceable.”96 The plaintiff filed a class action lawsuit in 
California state court alleging that DIRECTV had improperly charged cus-
tomers early termination fees.97 Not long after, the Court handed down 
91. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309–10.
92. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting). See 
also Carnegie v. Household Int’l, Inc., 376 F.3d 656, 661 (7th Cir. 2004) (Posner, J.) (“The realistic
alternative to a class action is not 17 million individual suits, but zero individual suits, as only a lunatic 
or a fanatic sues for $30.”).
93. Italian Colors, 133 S. Ct. at 2309.
94. Id. at 2309–12.
95. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 466 (2015).
96. Id.
97. Id.
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Concepcion; using Scalia’s Concepcion rationale, DIRECTV moved to 
dismiss the class action from the trial court, but both that court and an ap-
pellate court denied its motion, stating that the arbitration provision, with 
its “law of the state” clause, was rendered unconscionable by California 
law. The class action could proceed.98
The U.S. Supreme Court reversed the California appellate courts’ de-
cisions, concluding that the contract’s “law of the state” clause—despite 
being drafted before Concepcion—could apply only valid state law, absent 
any other clear directive; because Concepcion had previously invalidated 
Discover Bank—which held class arbitration waivers unconscionable—
current state law permitted such waivers.99 Thus, state law did not invali-
date the arbitration provision, and DIRECTV could compel the plaintiffs to 
arbitrate individually.100
Before I shut the cover on Part II, one other case, Lewis v. Epic Sys-
tems, merits a nota bene, as the Supreme Court recently heard oral argu-
ments on it and two other consolidated cases.101 While the Court divided in 
an ideologically unusual way in Imburgia,102 Lewis is poised to factionalize 
the justices in their familiar interpretive camps. In Lewis, the plaintiff 
class’s employer sent it an arbitration agreement mandating individual 
arbitration for certain “covered claims,” such as wage-and-hour disputes.103
The clause prevented plaintiffs from bringing a claim on behalf of other 
claimants, as well as arbitrators from combining multiple plaintiffs’ cases 
into one case.104 When a labor dispute developed between the lead plaintiff 
and Epic, the plaintiff sued on a class-wide basis.105 Epic moved to compel 
arbitration, but Lewis alleged that the arbitration provision violated the 
National Labor Relations Act (“NLRA”) by “interfer[ing] with employees’ 
98. Id. at 466–67.
99. Id. at 468–69.
100. Id. at 471.
101. Lewis v. Epic Sys. Corp., 823 F.3d 1147, 1151 (7th Cir. 2016), cert. granted, No. 16-285, 
2017 WL 125664 (U.S. Jan. 13, 2017). See also Ernst & Young LLP v. Morris, 834 F3d 975 (9th Cir. 
2016), cert. granted, No. 16-300, 137 S. Ct. 809 (Jan. 13, 2017); Murphy Oil USA, Inc. v. Nat’l Labor 
Relations Bd., 808 F.3d 1013 (5th Cir. 2015), cert. granted, No. 16-307, 137 S. Ct. 809 (Jan. 13, 2017). 
I have expounded on Epic System’s potential effects in a separate article that assesses class arbitration 
provision through a more employment-tinted lens. See generally Matthew Hamielec, Note, Lewis’s
Shifting Concepcions: The Seventh Circuit’s Struggle in Applying Class Action Preemption in Employ-
ment Contracts, 12 SEVENTH CIRCUIT REV. 92 (2017).
102. DIRECTV, Inc. v. Imburgia, 136 S. Ct. 463, 463 (2015).
103. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1154. 
104. Id. at 1154–55.
105. Id. at 1151.
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right to engage in concerted activities.”106 The district court denied Epic’s 
motion to dismiss.107
Under the NLRA, employees may “engage in concerted activities for 
the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual aid or protection” The 
NLRA additionally renders unenforceable any contracts that curbs employ-
ees’ rights guaranteed by the Act.108 The National Labor Relations Board 
(“NLRB”) has consistently prevented employers from imposing individual 
agreements that curb employees’ access to concerted actions.109
On appeal, Epic contended that, because Federal Rule of Civil Proce-
dure 23 did not exist when the NLRA was enacted in the mid-1930s, the 
NLRA could not have protected an action that did not exist when it was 
passed.110 The Seventh Circuit disagreed; writing for a unanimous court, 
Chief Judge Diane Wood opined that Rule 23’s promulgators did not divine 
class actions from thin air. And while the Act did not explicitly define 
“concerted activities,” the Seventh Circuit interpreted “concerted activity” 
as including modern class actions in its definition.111 Thus, the NLRA pro-
tected the litigation filed by the plaintiff class.112
Finding that Rule 23 class actions clearly fit in the definition of “con-
certed activity,” the three-judge panel further concluded that Epic’s indi-
vidual arbitration provision ran afoul of the NLRA; the clause prevented 
employees from suing through an aggregate action, and thus qualified as an 
“unfair labor practice.”113 Unlike some of its sister circuits that had en-
forced individual arbitration provisions, the Seventh Circuit found an indi-
vidually bargained-for arbitration agreement limiting concerted actions in 
such a way per se invalid.114
Finally, on the issue of whether the FAA conflicts with and supersedes 
the NLRA in its mandate to enforce Epic’s arbitration clause, Judge Wood 
interpreted that the former did not require the court to enforce the provi-
106. Id.
107. Id.
108. Id. at 1151–52 (quoting N.L.R.B. v. City Disposal Sys. Inc., 465 U.S. 822, 831 (1984)).
109. Id. at 1152.
110. Id. at 1154.
111. Id. at 1153.
112. Id.
113. Id. at 1155.
114. See Hamielec, supra note 101, at 17 n.112 (“In her opinion, Judge Wood points out that the 
NLRB has followed such a per se mantra in its hearings as well, and that the Ninth Circuit failed to cite 
why it did not engage practice Chevron deference to the Board’s decisions. I suspect that the Ninth 
Circuit might have been trying to be Solomonic in its decision, given that most Supreme Court jurispru-
dence does not favor employees in such situation. The Seventh Circuit’s decision, then, tilts more 
toward the idealistic.”).
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sion.115 The Act’s savings clause—which requires courts to enforce ADR 
agreements “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for [their] 
revocation”—permitted the NLRA class action to continue because the 
NLRA itself made the arbitration clause illegal.116
Wood excoriated a Fifth Circuit decision upholding similar employee 
arbitration provisions for parroting Scalia’s ‘class arbitration is inefficient’ 
rationale.117 She posited that courts’ crusades for speedy arbitrations under 
Concepcion and Italian Color’s jurisprudence cannot usurp all class-action-
permitting statutes to protect ADR from the judiciary’s scrutiny.118 For 
these reasons, the Seventh Circuit found Epic’s arbitration agreement unen-
forceable.119
III. ARGUMENTS SUPPORTING AND CRITIQUING THE CLASS 
ARBITRATION MECHANISM
With the case law laid out above, the rift between plaintiffs classes’ 
and commercial defendants’ interests seems as dichotomous as that be-
tween Montague and Capulet—or, for those keener on a modern reference, 
Houses Lannister and Stark.120 “BigLaw” firms advocate strongly for 
commercial institutions who want to retain the benefits of individual arbi-
tration; they believe the current system offers a less-flawed option to tradi-
tional class actions, and actually provides individuals with superior 
economic outcomes than litigation. On the other side, academics champion 
the cause of consumers, employees, and shareholders who seek such class 
litigation; scholars purport reforms of a system that they believe allows 
businesses to avoid liability and behavior-deterring damages. In Part III, 
this Note traces the various stances taken by legal, governmental, and lay 
sources on class arbitration; it does so to lay the groundwork for Part IV’s 
reformative discussion, as well as conceptualize the theories behind certain 
legislative and regulatory proposals.
A. Academic Opinions
Most legal scholars who have focused on class action arbitration have 
criticized individual arbitrations as limiting claimants’ recovery to an im-
115. Lewis, 823 F.3d at 1160.
116. Id. at 1156, 1159.
117. Id. at 1158.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1161.
120. See generally GEORGE R. R. MARTIN, A SONG OF ICE AND FIRE: STORM OF SWORDS, (Ban-
tam ed., 2000).
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practical mechanism. For example, Brian A. Fitzpatrick concluded that, if 
Congress or the administrative agencies leave the Court’s class arbitration 
holdings unaltered, businesses will methodically “eliminate virtually all 
class actions.”121
Fitzpatrick indicated that Congress enacted the FAA to apply to com-
mercial contracts between businesses (“B2B”), and not to contracts be-
tween a business and individuals (“B2C”).122 For businesses, the 
streamlined procedures, lack of a jury (and the unpredictability that derives 
from one), and acumen of a professional arbitrator provide efficient dispute 
resolution.123
These features do not necessarily disadvantage non-commercial plain-
tiffs, but businesses hold at least two advantages when contracting with 
individuals that they often do not possess when contracting with another 
business: a superior bargaining position, and the added benefit of a “repeat 
player effect” when they appear before arbitrators on a habitual basis. 
While B2B contracting often occurs between parties with congruent bar-
gaining power, B2C contracts feature asymmetrical bargaining power be-
tween the individual and the business. Hence, businesses can leverage their 
dominant position and require consumers, employees, and shareholders to 
sign contracts that prescribe individual arbitration, curb the use of proce-
dural tools (in, for example, the number of interrogatories claimants can 
ask of the business or the number of experts claimants can use), and require 
the claimant to pay the business’s attorney’s fees and costs of arbitration.124
Without these tools, the arbitration provisions preclude individuals 
from adequately gleaning needed evidence from their opponent and pre-
senting them to an arbitrator. Thus, the individual arbitration mechanism all 
but forecloses the possibility of “negative value” claimants receiving any 
relief. Again, Justice Breyer pointed this fact out while dissenting in Con-
cepcion.125
Fitzpatrick also observed that enterprises that block class actions, es-
pecially in the securities fraud context, effectively dull the deterrent effect 
121. Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 163.
122. Id. at 164.
123. Id. at 165.
124. See, e.g., In re Checking Account Overdraft Litig., MDL No. 2036, 685 F.3d 1269, 1282
(11th Cir. 2012) (holding unconscionable a “provision allowing BB&T, and only BB&T, to recover 
‘any loss, costs, or expenses’ arising from ‘any dispute’ with [its customers], regardless of the outcome 
of the dispute”).
125. AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 365 (2011) (Breyer, J., dissenting) 
(“What rational lawyer would have signed on to represent the Concepcions in litigation for the possibil-
ity of fees stemming from a $30.22 claim?”).
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of damages levied against them via individual arbitration.126 However, his 
assertion extends well beyond securities fraud. Litigation’s deterrent ef-
fect—one of the fundamental goals of tort law—serves as one check (an 
efficient and free market acting as another, for example) against businesses 
from developing poorly designed or unsafe products. It keeps manufactur-
ers and service providers “honest” by offering a legal stick to their market-
profiting carrot.
The author joined other scholastics in predicting that businesses will 
nullify the class action mechanism.127 Because consumers, shareholders, 
and employees all have transactional relationships with commercial enti-
ties, those entities can require each of these groups to enter into pre-dispute 
contracts with them.128 As a result, businesses both wield the means and 
enjoy a conducive legal environment to preclude the maintenance of over 
three-quarters of all current federal class action cases filed against them.129
And though the commercial world has started incorporating arbitration 
clauses and class action waivers at a more sluggish rate than anticipated, 
Fitzpatrick nevertheless believed that all large business entities will incor-
porate both provisions in their form contracts over time.130 He also cited
that people might unwittingly accede to the provisions’ incorporation be-
cause they do not act rationally when accounting for future risk.131
To build on the introduction’s example, consumers who buy a cell 
phone are inundated with a forest’s-worth of paperwork, some from the 
manufacturer, some from the service provider, and some from the retailer. 
People faced with a flood of fine print simply do not care enough to read it 
before accepting its terms, regardless of whether a provision is conspicu-
ous, bolded, and precedes all other provisions. They just want the shiny, 
new phone that unlocks itself by scanning your face! And as Intelligentsia 
baristas and sleep-deprived law students alike try to position their heads at 
126. Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 194–95.
127. Id. at 176.
128. Id. at 174 (discussing Myriam Gilles, Opting Out of Liability: The Forthcoming, Near Total
Demise of the Modern Class Action, 104 MICH. L. REV. 373 (2005).
129. Id. at 175. Fitzpatrick did not study the types of class actions that plaintiffs bring in state 
courts, but hypothesizes that the composition of those classes mirror those in federal court. Sharehold-
ers, employees, and consumers. Id.
130. Id. at 174.
131. Id. at 190 (citing Daniel B. Klaff, Debiasing and Bidirectional Bias: Cognitive Failure in 
Mandatory Employment Arbitration, 15 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 1, 12 (2010)) (“The application of 
optimism bias to the mandatory arbitration setting is relatively straightforward: employees may under-
estimate the likelihood that they will experience the kind of negative workplace event that would give 
rise to a dispute requiring arbitration or litigation.”).
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just the right angle to bear witness to this technological feat,132 their apathy 
allows businesses to satiate their need to reduce legal risk. As these indi-
viduals walk away with a sleek new phone, they have no clue that the man-
ufacturer, service provider, and retailer have each (virtually) foreclosed 
those individuals’ ability to litigate. Only once peoples’ Note 7 phablets 
start spontaneously combusting do they think of suing for redress, and by 
that point they may be relegated to arbitration.133
Indeed, commercial entities look to extend this opacity beyond those 
products that require a lot of contract-signing. Fitzpatrick noted that tech-
nological advancements and “legal notions of contract formation” could 
cause businesses to print class action waivers and arbitration provisions on 
a product’s packaging, with binding effect.134 This “total incorporation” 
theory may not rise to the level of ubiquity that the author foresees, but he 
is not likely to be far off the mark. After all,
whether businesses will take advantage of the opportunity to slip arbitra-
tion clauses with class action waivers into all their contracts [. . .] is 
largely a rhetorical [question]. Why wouldn’t businesses take advantage 
of this opportunity? As I noted at the outset, in many cases, these waiv-
ers are tantamount to insulating businesses altogether from liability for 
the small-stakes injuries they cause. Why wouldn’t every business want 
such insulation? I think every business would.135
132. Nick T., Here Is How the Iris Scanner on the Galaxy Note 7 Works, PHONEARENA.COM,
(Aug. 8, 2016, 8:45 AM), http://www.phonearena.com/news/Here-is-how-the-Galaxy-Note-7-iris-
scanner-works_id82854 [https://perma.cc/A9HH-CJYD] Though one can only hope that the phone 
doesn’t set fire to users before they get a chance to experience this novelty. See Kyle Wiggers, Every-
thing We Know About Samsung’s Galaxy Note 7 Recall, DIGITAL TRENDS,
http://www.digitaltrends.com/mobile/samsung-halts-galaxy-note-7-shipments-phones-catching-fire 
[https://perma.cc/CGH9-S9CN].
133. In a particularly damning series of events, Samsung tried to enforce its individual arbitration 
provision when people suffered injuries from the self-combusting Galaxy Note 7 and Gear S Smart-
watch devices. See CBS News Politics, Samsung Exploding Phone Lawsuits May Be Derailed by Fine 
Print, CBS NEWS (Feb. 18, 2017, 9:43 AM), http://www.cbsnews.com/news/samsung-galaxy-note-7-
fine-print-class-action-waiver-lawsuits/;18, 2017); Charles Toutant, ‘Hidden’ Samsung Arbitration 
Clause Held Non-Binding, N.J. L.J., http://www.njlawjournal.com/id=1202752378136/Hidden-
Samsung-Arbitration-Clause-Held-NonBinding?slreturn=20170118160038 [https://perma.cc/5E5N-
ELSW]. In the case of the smartwatch, the District of New Jersey found an individual arbitration provi-
sion buried in the final pages of the product’s warranty materials as inconspicuous and unenforceable, 
though Samsung is not going down without a fight in the Third Circuit. Noble v. Samsung Elecs. Am., 
Inc., No. 15-3713, 2016 WL 1029790, at *1 (D.N.J. Mar. 15, 2016), aff’d, No. 16-1903, 2016 WL 
1029790 (3d Cir. 2016). Similarly, public outrage has caused companies like Equifax to walk back the 
scope of its arbitration agreement in the wake of a massive data breach. See David Lazarus, The Real 
Outrage Isn’t Equifax’s Arbitration Clause—It’s All the Others, L.A. TIMES (Sept. 12, 2017), 
http://www.latimes.com/business/lazarus/la-fi-lazarus-equifax-arbitration-clauses-20170912-story.html.
134. Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 176–77. Courts have upheld the validity of such “package”
contractual provisions, despite the fact that the consumer might not have had the opportunity to read the 
language on the packaging until after she bought it.
135. Id. at 190.
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To build on this point, if a certain industry like the cellular service 
providers uniformly include class action waivers and arbitration provisions 
in their form contracts, those provisions leave consumers without a substi-
tute good that lacks those provisions. Employees who seek a comparable 
job with a contract featuring no such provision and advocative shareholders 
who look for substitute investments in a corporation without the waiver 
printed on its stock certificates could face the same frustration.
Fitzpatrick surmised that after Concepcion’s repeal of the Discover 
Bank rule and the Court’s holding in Italian Colors, existing law cannot 
proscribe companies from implementing pre-dispute class action waivers in 
their contracts.136 He recognized that courts might deem less-generous arbi-
tration clauses than Concepcion’s137 unconscionable, but noted that neither
the Court in Italian Colors nor lower federal courts138 have hesitated to 
uphold uncharitable arbitration agreements.139 Further, Fitzpatrick doubted 
that many statutes would rise to the level of Italian Color’s “contrary con-
gressional command” requirement sufficient to circumvent the FAA; only 
one statute, the Dodd Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection 
Act of 2010 (“Dodd-Frank”), possesses such a command.140
136. Id.
137. See AT&T Mobility LLC v. Concepcion, 563 U.S. 333, 336–37 (2011).
138. Fitzpatrick notes that some courts might scrutinize other provisions of the arbitration agree-
ment, such as the payment of both sides’ attorneys’ fees as unconscionable, but suggests that corpora-
tions who face such a conclusion of unconscionability will simply scrap those provisions from their 
agreements over time in order to preserve their class action waiver. Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 187.
139. See Am. Express Co. v. Italian Colors Rest., 133 S. Ct. 2304, 2312 (2013). Fitzpatrick, supra
note 31, at 186 n.117 (quoting Coneff v. AT&T Corp., 673 F.3d 1155, 1159 (9th Cir. 2012) (“[T]he 
concern is not so much that customers have no effective means to vindicate their rights, but rather that 
customers have insufficient incentive to do so . . . . But as the Supreme Court stated in Concepcion, 
such unrelated policy concerns, however worthwhile, cannot undermine the FAA.” (citations omitted); 
Brokers’ Servs. Mktg. Grp. v. Cellco P’ship, No. 10-3973 JAP, 2012 WL 1048423, at *5 (D.N.J. Mar. 
28, 2012) (“[T]he Plaintiffs here do not claim that it is impossible to seek their recovery in the manner 
prescribed by the arbitration agreement, but only that it would be an economically irrational decision to 
do so. The Supreme Court has held that this rationale for class actions cannot override the FAA.”).
140. Dodd-Frank abrogates individual arbitration by granting the CFPB regulatory authority to 
limit pre-dispute arbitration clauses’ prevalence in consumer financial products and services. Indeed, 
the CFPB has used this charge to propose regulations that this Note discusses in Part IV. At the same 
time, Dodd-Frank does not expressly allow for consumer class actions concerning financial products or 
services. Further, the scholar cites to several such statutes that allow plaintiffs to sue as a group, such as 
the Age Discrimination in Employment Act, the Environmental Protection Act, and the Fair Labor 
Standards Act. He notes, however, that the group lawsuits purported under these statutes qualify as 
“opt-in” actions as opposed to “opt out” actions under FRCP 23. Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 188. By 
and large, then, current federal statutes do not ameliorate the problems caused by Concepcion and its 
progeny. Nor are states likely to alter their contract law to promote class arbitration, where they can. 
Fitzpatrick does note that Delaware is well-poised and other states in which it is popular to incorporate 
a business could enact legislation barring class waivers for corporations looking to incorporate in the 
state. But he expresses doubt that many other “state courts will engage in a wholesale rewrite of their 
contract.” Id. at 178. 
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The author concluded that congressional inaction, paired with Con-
cepcion and Italian Colors, creates a regime where businesses will fully 
incorporate arbitration agreements and class action waivers into their 
standard form contracts.141 If left unperturbed, these contracts eventually 
will lead to the demise of class actions against commercial actors.142
Erwin Chemerinsky and Catherine Fisk co-authored an article that an-
alyzed Concepcion shortly after it came down.143 In it, the authors scruti-
nized the Court majority’s policy points in support of federal preemption of 
state prohibitions on class arbitration waivers.144 They found the arguments 
unpersuasive.
The authors first tackled Justice Scalia’s belief that class arbitration 
threatened the informal, economical, and procedurally streamlined envi-
ronment of ADR; they excoriated the majority for “argu[ing] from [arbitra-
tion’s] definition,” and noted that preserving an arbitration provision’s 
reduced procedures (i.e.—rules limiting the number of experts or interroga-
tories, more informal rules of evidence) until they rose to affect substantive 
rights was a capricious standard.145 They opined, “What if the arbitration 
agreement provided that arbitrators must resolve a case by flipping a coin? 
What if the arbitration agreement eliminated pretrial discovery? Simply 
saying that arbitration is informal tells us nothing about why the FAA 
preempts state laws prohibiting excessive informality.”146 The pair criti-
cized the majority for failing to demarcate the line between a streamlined 
procedure and a substantive right.147
Chemerinsky and Fisk were even more contemptuous of the majori-
ty’s other argument—that class arbitration waivers protect defendants from 
frivolous, low-value suits with little appellate review.148 The authors lam-
basted the Court majority for implementing a double standard, under which 
defendants can force plaintiffs to cede “protections of the federal rules of 
evidence . . . the right to proceed as a class, or the right to judicial review of 
arbitrator error,” but plaintiffs cannot force defendants to arbitrate against a 
class.149 They further castigated the Court for failing to consider that a loss 
141. Id. at 197.
142. Id. at 199.
143. Catherine Fisk & Erwin Chemerinsky, The Failing Faith in Class Actions: Wal-Mart v. 
Dukes and AT&T Mobility v. Concepcion, 7 DUKE J. CONST. L. & PUB. POL’Y. 73, 88 (2011). 




148. Id. at 89–90.
149. Id. at 90.
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of several thousand dollars to an individual might be proportionally larger 
than a multi-million dollar loss to AT&T. Chemerinsky and Fisk then ac-
cused the majority of partisan obstructionism:
The Court could not have been more explicit that its goal was to protect 
corporations against consumers who wish to vindicate statutory or com-
mon-law claims for fraud or false advertising. Class arbitration is unac-
ceptable because the process “increases risks to defendants,” inasmuch
as the aggregated damages might constitute “a devastating loss” that 
would “pressure[]” them “into settling questionable claims.” This asser-
tion of the need for federal preemption is outrageous as a statement of 
values and deeply troubling as an indication of the future trend in the 
law. Parties settle “questionable claims” all the time, sometimes to the 
defendant’s financial advantage and sometimes to the plaintiff’s.150
Scathing allegation aside, the authors failed to address exactly what 
makes parties settle questionable claims. If a commercial defendant felt that 
a plaintiff class’ claim had no merit, what would create such an irresistible 
urge to settle?151
Some claim that an ostensible lack of judicial review in arbitration in-
duces commercial defendants to hedge their risk by settling rather than 
fully arbitrating a questionable, large-value class arbitration to a decision. 
If an arbitrator would decide a class arbitration in favor of the plaintiffs, a 
court could only review such a decision under narrow circumstances like 
fraud, which means that the arbitral decision, and the damages award, 
would likely remain unaltered. Hence, if the business could negotiate a 
settlement amount lower than the alleged damages purported by the large-
value class, that business could reduce its risk of paying out damages that 
would not be reviewable by a judge.
In summary, academia’s general vibe connotes disapproval toward the 
arbitration clause/class action waiver combo.152 Many scholars have called 
for reform, hoping that Congress will pass comprehensive legislation that 
allows claimants to litigate as a class.153 And Congress has tried to respond, 
but to no avail.154 Part III next turns academia’s intellectual foil on the mat-
ter: large law firms.
150. Id.
151. MARCUS ET AL, supra note 1 at 223.
152. See, e.g., Fitzpatrick, supra note 31; Fisk & Chemerinsky, supra note 143; Glover, supra note 
32; Sternlight, supra note 32.
153. The trend has not been so much to advocate on behalf of class arbitration, but more so to 
merely allow claimants a chance to get a class certified in court or to outright commercial defendants’
pairing of class action waivers and arbitration clauses. See Fitzpatrick, supra note 31, at 188.
154. See Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017); Arbitration Fairness 
Act of 2017, S. 537, 115th Cong. (2017); Mandatory Arbitration Transparency Act of 2017, S. 647, 
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B. “BigLaw” Opinions
BigLaw extolls the virtues of individual arbitration. Its stance juxta-
poses well with professors’ by highlighting some compelling arguments for 
the maintenance of class action waivers and arbitration provisions. That 
large law firms support individual arbitration should not come as a shock; 
when a plaintiffs’ class sues a corporation, the corporation often retains a 
BigLaw firm to represent it, and one should expect the literature these firms 
distribute to cater to clients’ needs.155 After all, as the aside-indulgent Fran-
cis Underwood crassly confessed, “when the money’s coming your way, 
you don’t ask any questions.”156
Weil, Gotshal & Manges LLP published an article in which two au-
thors praised Concepcion and Italian Colors while depicting Oxford as 
decided on a specific fact pattern and under a rarely applied form of judi-
cial review.157 Yet, the Weil attorneys cautioned their readers not to reserve 
to an arbitrator the question of whether an arbitration clause allows for 
class arbitration. If the arbitrator had the power to make such a determina-
tion, her opinion on the matter will be virtually veiled158 from judicial re-
view; instead, the authors argue, parties should “seek judicial determination 
of the issue as one of substantive arbitrability.”159 If a court declines to 
interpret the arbitration clause, a business’s counsel should object to the 
“arbitral resolution of the question each step of the way so as to preserve 
the issue for judicial review.”160 This preservation will allow an appellate 
court to review the arbitral decision de novo, rather than under a narrower 
standard limited to, for example, fraud.161
The article drove home the point that businesses who wish to avoid 
the threat of class arbitration must unambiguously express its unavailabil-
ity. The authors then concluded with two other prescriptions. First, they 
advised a provision stating that, if an arbitrator or a court allows for class 
115th Cong. (2017); Mandatory Arbitration Transparency Act of 2017, H.R. 4130, 115th Cong. (2017); 
Arbitration Transpaerency Act of 2017, H.R. 832, 115th Cong. (2017); Safety over Arbitration Act of 
2017, S. 542, 115th Cong. (2017); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. (2015); 
Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, S. 1133, 114th Cong. (2015); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2013, H.R. 
1844, 113th Cong. (2013); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2011, H.R. 1873, 112th Cong. (2011); Arbitra-
tion Fairness Act of 2009, H.R. 1020, 111th Cong. (2009); Arbitration Fairness Act of 2007, H.R. 3010, 
110th Cong. (2007).
155. See, e.g., Deuelle & Berman, supra note 29.
156. House of Cards: Chapter 20, NETFLIX (Feb. 14, 2014), http://www.netflix.com.
157. Deuelle & Berman, supra note 29, at 8.
158. See Part III, infra.
159. Id.
160. Deuelle and Berman, supra note 29, at 8.
161. Id.
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proceedings, then the arbitration agreement will be rendered unenforceable 
and further proceedings will occur in court.162 Second, the attorneys sug-
gested that drafters include language that bars “attempted consolidation of 
individual arbitration claims, which could potentially be the next wave of 
attempts at aggregated, multilateral arbitration now that class arbitration 
can be effectively guarded against by careful drafting.”163
Weil was not the only firm to buttress its clients’ form contracts with 
language that would shrink the possibility of a judge or arbitrator interpret-
ing contracts as allowing class arbitration. Across the country, law firms 
that represented commercial clients issued memos on Concepcion and Ital-
ian Colors’ potential impacts, and offered suggestions on how to trek the 
new legal landscape.164
One of the more measured articles came from WilmerHale in a No-
vember 2015 issue of the New York Law Journal.165 In referencing the 
Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s proposed arbitration-curbing rule 
(discussed in greater detail in Part IV), the authors chided scholars and the 
federal agency for asserting class arbitration’s demise from pure theory 
without quantitative metrics. They noted that, not only do arbitrators con-
tinue to allow class arbitrations,166 but also that proposed regulations by the 
162. Id.
163. Id.
164. Many law firms called on companies to ensure that their arbitration provisions contained 
generous terms for potential claimants so as not to be considered substantively altering of claimants’
rights, and therefore be contra to the FAA. Others stressed that businesses design specific procedures 
and rules to govern the arbitrations. And yes, a select few firms gaudily touted Concepcion and Italian
Colors as impervious jurisprudential fortresses that required judges to enforce individual arbitration 
provisions until Congress took further action. See Patrick M. Miller & Patrick J. O’Connor, Jr., Manag-
ing Your Class-Action Risk Through Arbitration Agreements, FAEGRE BAKER DANIELS LLP (Apr. 13, 
2015), http://www.faegrebd.com/managing-your-class-action-risk-through-arbitration-agreements; 
[https://perma.cc/V6FG-YN6M]; Kirkland Alert, Supreme Court Upholds Class-Action Ban in Arbitra-
tion Agreements, KIRKLAND & ELLIS LLP (May 2011), 
http://www.kirkland.com/siteFiles/Publications/Alert_050211.pdf [https://perma.cc/4TVM-2BM6]; 
Memorandum, Recent Supreme Court Decision on Arbitration of Class Action Claims Presents Signifi-
cant Opportunities for Employers, SIMPSON THACHER & BARTLETT LLP (May 3, 2011), 
http://www.stblaw.com/docs/default-source/cold-fusion-existing-
content/publications/pub1200.pdf?sfvrsn=2 [https://perma.cc/Q9NM-TZ26];Arbitration Update, The




165. James H. Carter & John V.H. Pierce, Have Class Arbitrations Found New Life?, N.Y.L.J. 




166. For example, they cite that post-Concepcion, the American Arbitration Association still had 
nearly 150 class arbitrations on their docket. Id. Another arbitration service provider, JAMS, noted 
almost fifty class arbitration cases filed since 2013. Id.
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CFPB indicate that class arbitration may see a resurgence in the consumer 
finance setting.167 The authors did not shy away from pointing out that 
those class arbitrations that proceeded as negative value suits often resulted 
in negligible or no damage awards for plaintiffs but high plaintiffs’ attor-
neys’ fees.168 The authors then derided the CFPB’s proposal, questioning 
whether the Bureau reached any meaningful conclusions about class arbi-
trations and their outcomes relative to individual arbitrations.169 The au-
thors further criticized the Bureau for relegating claimants bound by 
arbitration clauses and class action waivers to the imperfect but allegedly 
plaintiff-preferred world of ordinary class actions.170
More recently, and in the wake of the Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau’s issuance of and Congress’s resolution to repeal a rule addressing 
arbitration provisions in the consumer banking and credit card contexts has 
led BigLaw firms to dramatically their client advice. Initial BigLaw reac-
tion to the CFPB’s rule caused firms to advise affected clients to wholly 
remove arbitration provisions from their consumer-related contracts. At the 
very least, firms reemphasized their earlier advice to place savings clauses 
into consumer contracts so as to cleanly sever the enforceable parts of the 
agreements from the arbitration provisions whose potential unenforceabil-
ity could cause the entire contact to be unenforceable. Naturally, when 
President Trump signed the congressional resolution invalidating the CFPB 
regulation in late 2017, companies (either on their own, or through their 
outside counsels) once again flocked to the arbitral forums’ benefits.
C. Media Perspectives
Beginning in 2015, several mainstream media articles on arbitration 
provisions ballooned what was a sparsely covered area in the early 2000s 
into a politically-laden cottage industry that robustly covers ADR to this 
day.171 This segment will focus on two news sources: the New York Times 
and its editorial doppelganger, the Wall Street Journal.
167. Id. This contention seems misguided, though, as the proposed regulation is unclear on wheth-
er a class will be allowed to pursue arbitration, or whether it will stay in litigation once certified. Part IV 
discusses the CFPB’s regulation in detail.
168. The article notes that in one case, for example, a plaintiffs’ class received no actual damage 
awards, and only $2 million dollars in punitive damage awards, which were paid out to two consumer 
protection organizations. Id. The attorneys, on the other hand pocketed $2.6 million in fees. Id.
169. Id.
170. Id.
171. Admittedly, the articles’ authors tend to paint with a broad brush, generalize the overarching 
theories on both of the arguments’ sides, and make victims of claimants and demons of companies, or 
vice versa.
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Through several articles over the past few years, the Wall Street Jour-
nal depicted a full-frontal war between plaintiffs’ attorneys and business-
es.172 The paper described a proliferation of “specious lawsuits” in which 
plaintiffs’ lawyers accumulated fortunes at the expense of businesses and 
consumers.173 Arbitration allegedly curbs this practice through its proce-
durally efficient, convenient, and cost-effective methods; it creates an al-
ternative to the negative value class action, in which named representatives 
did not have a sufficient stake to monitor the attorneys174 handling the case, 
and lawyers settled claims for minimal amounts per client and then paid 
themselves exorbitant fees.175 One author of a 2015 article cited the Searle 
Civil Justice report from Northwestern Law School as empirical evidence 
that claimants fared better in arbitration than in traditional litigation.176
That author viewed the CFPB’s proposed regulation (described in Part IV) 
as a step backward for consumers, and its director, Richard Cordray, as a 
partisan administrator beholden to lining the pockets of the plaintiffs’ 
bar.177 When President Trump signed the resolution repealing the rule The 
Journal hailed the decision as a successful deterrent of dubious class action 
suits.178 Unsurprisingly, other newspapers disagreed.
In the autumn of 2015, the New York Times printed a three-part expo-
sé delving into the world of mandatory arbitration clauses and class action 
waivers.179 In its first installment, the Times painted businesses as conniv-
172. James R. Copland, Why the Trial Bar and Its Friends Detest Arbitration, WALL ST. J. (Dec.
25, 2015), https://www.wsj.com/articles/why-the-trial-bar-and-its-friends-detest-arbitration-
1451065475 [https://perma.cc/M2HL-V4A7]; Andrew Ackerman & Yuka Hayashi, Congress Makes it 
Harder to Sue the Financial Industry, WALL ST. J. (Oct. 24, 2017), 
https://www.wsj.com/articles/congress-votes-to-overturn-cfpb-arbitration-rule-1508897968.
173. Id.
174. This claim strikes me as dubious, given that named representatives in such negative value 
claims can be compensated for their time in acting as an effective representative. Frequently, this 
amount surpasses the damages award that other plaintiffs in the class receive. Thus, if the author’s
thesis—that paltry damage awards leads to poor monitoring by the named representative—is to be taken 
at any value, it works under the assumption that named plaintiffs receive no compensation other than 
their damage award.
175. This claim is susceptible to criticism. Insofar as federal cases are concerned, the Federal 
Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 23(h) requires that a court review and approve attorney’s fees, both in 
cases that reach judgment and cases that settle. FED. R. CIV. P. 23(h). Attorneys cannot simply divine a 
number they feel is appropriate for their time spent on a lawsuit. Judges possess the discretion to reduce 
attorneys’ fees that overcharge their clients. Similarly, with coupon settlements, many judges have
observed the practice of awarding legal fees as a function of the proportion of coupons that are re-
deemed, thus reducing the risk of abuse with such settlements or awards. Insofar as state law class 
actions are concerned, courts’ powers to review attorney’s fees varies. Thus, there can be a greater 
chance for fee abuse at the state level. 
176. Copland, supra note 172.
177. Ackerman & Hayashi, supra note 172.
178. Id.
179. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 11; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, In 
Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 1, 2015), 
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ing entities who hired BigLaw attorneys to provide them with a miraculous 
instrument that would eradicate their exposure to “frivolous lawsuits.”180
The Times noted that the Chamber of Commerce flanked class actions from 
another direction by pushing for legislative reform that manifested itself as 
the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”)181 and that reduced the “scourge” 
of litigation by allowing companies to remove state-filed class actions 
(which, in some jurisdictions, proved plaintiff-friendly182) into federal 
court.183 Yet, state courts faced with contracts mandating individual arbitra-
tions continued to strike them down as unconscionable, actions that cause 
businesses to seek Supreme Court review.184
Eventually, these appeals yielded the Concepcion and Italian Colors
holdings, decisions that the New York Times article implies led to a renais-
sance-like “birth of a thousand clauses” in consumer contracts that people 
unwittingly signed without knowledge of their repercussions.185 Addition-
ally, the article’s quantitative findings indicated that an infinitesimal num-
ber of people who hold valid claims against businesses proceed to arbitrate 
once they find out they cannot litigate in court.186
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/02/business/dealbook/in-arbitration-a-privatization-of-the-justice-
system.html [https://perma.cc/95KU-X57U]; Jessica Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, In Religious 
Arbitration, Scripture Is the Rule of Law, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 2, 2015), 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/11/03/business/dealbook/in-religious-arbitration-scripture-is-the-rule-of-
law.html [https://perma.cc/VLC9-DM5F].
180. The article credits Ballard Spahr’s Alan Kaplinsky as the godfather of the modern class action 
waiver and individual arbitration clause, a legal wizard who “twin[ned] arbitration clauses with class 
action bans” and consulted with representatives from large credit card companies, banks, retail giants, 
and automobile manufacturers on how to incorporate his creation into form contracts. Silver-Greenberg 
& Gebeloff, supra note 11.
181. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
182. Q&A: Managing and resolving class action disputes, FINANCIER WORLDWIDE (Oct. 2013), 
http://www.financierworldwide.com/qa-managing-and-resolving-class-action-disputes/#.VsoGvfIrKM8 
[https://perma.cc/FWD5-62VJ].
183. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, supra note 11.
184. Id.
185. Consumer contracts with Amazon, Netflix, Travelocity, eBay and DirecTV now contain 
arbitration clauses. Even Ashley Madison, the online site for adulterers, requires that clients agree to 
them. Id. The authors pointed out that some arbitration provisions incorporate opt-out language in their 
clauses, but that very few consumers take advantage of those opt out procedures. Id. However, when 
faced with sufficient public outcry, such as in the recent Equifax breach, some companies will abandon 
these arbitration clauses completely. For an additional list of companies that use arbitration provisions, 
see CBS News Politics, supra note 133.
186. This figure, while not quantifiable, has at least some inferential support. Silver-Greenberg & 
Gebeloff, supra note 11. See also Silver-Greenberg & Robert Gebeloff, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization 
of the Justice System’, supra note 179 (“Prevented from joining together as a group in arbitration, most 
plaintiffs gave up entirely, records show.”).
2017] ASYMMETRIC BARGAINING POWER 1255
More than other sources,187 the Times article focused on employees’ 
interactions with arbitration agreements and class waivers.188 The piece 
noted that companies use the clauses in contracts not only with ordinary 
and low-ranking employees, but also in contracts with corporate officers as 
well, and evidenced that even individuals who have above-average bargain-
ing power (though still less power than commercial entities) must submit to 
arbitration’s dominion.189
In its second article, the Times intensified its critique of arbitration 
proceedings by examining the procedures employed in arbitration. The 
author wrote,
Over the last 10 years, thousands of businesses across the country—from 
big corporations to storefront shops—have used arbitration to create an 
alternate system of justice. There, rules tend to favor businesses, and 
judges and juries have been replaced by arbitrators who commonly con-
sider the companies their clients . . . . “This amounts to the wholescale 
privatization of the justice system.” . . . “Americans are actively being 
deprived of their rights.”190
The article’s assertion that the arbitral system is skewed to business’ 
advantage seems embellished. After all, AAA and JAMS rules specify that 
both parties must agree to an arbitrator before the arbitration proceeds.191
But, the second installment of the Times series noted that “more than three 
dozen arbitrators described how they felt beholden to companies. Beneath 
every decision, the arbitrators said, was the threat of losing business.”192
This pro-business effect compounds in the class action setting because 
of the confidential nature of arbitration proceedings, an effective conven-
187. See, e.g., Consumer Reports, Know What You’re Giving Up with Arbitration Clauses, BOS.
GLOBE (Jan. 3, 2016), https://www.bostonglobe.com/business/2016/01/03/the-consumer-rights-you-
giving-away/1yD9doj2vBZdOKNCkxCmFK/
story.html; With Mandatory Arbitration, Corporate America Opts Out of the Legal System, DAILY BUS.
REV. (Jan. 19, 2016), http://www.dailybusinessreview.com/id=1202747147639/With-Mandatory-
Arbitration-Corporate-America-Opts-Out-of-the-Legal-System?slreturn=20160128215741 
[https://perma.cc/TTA7-K4K3]; Mandy Walker, The Arbitration Clause Hidden in Many Consumer 
Contracts and the Consumer Rights You’re Giving Away as a Result, CONSUMER REPORTS (Sept. 29, 
2015), http://www.consumerreports.org/cro/shopping/the-arbitration-clause-hidden-in-many-consumer-
contracts (last visited Feb. 18, 2017).
188. Silver-Greenberg and Gebeloff, supra note 11.
189. Id.
190. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, supra
note 179. Additionally, Professor Lisa Bingham notes that repeat players (in these cases, commercial 
entities) hold a distinct advantage in arbitration than “single-shot” claimants. For more on this theory, 
see Lisa Bingham, Employment Arbitration: the Repeat Player Effect, 1 EMP. RTS. EMP. POL’Y J. 189, 
192 (1997).
191. Silver-Greenberg & Gebeloff, In Arbitration, a ‘Privatization of the Justice System’, supra
note 179.
192. Id.
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ience for businesses who do not seek to have potential claimants looking to 
file a class arbitration (assuming a contract that even allows for one.)193 In
another section, the Times authors noted one firm’s rules of evidence: 
“What rules of evidence apply?” one arbitration firm asks in the question 
and answer section of its website. “The short answer is none.”194 The arti-
cle also mentions a lack of juries in these proceedings.195
The second article shifted to a more stinging tone when it commented 
on perceived conflicts that arbitrators possess with commercial defendants. 
Among the usual critiques of pre-dispute arbitration agreements—including 
inequities in bargaining power and the lack of appellate review—The 
Times described arbitrators and defense counsels lunching and attending 
sporting events together.196 Records revealed that arbitrators habitually 
handle cases for the same corporate defendants over the course of four 
years. While this would seem innocuous enough, certain scholars believe 
that arbitrators who consistently decide cases for the same client develop a 
bias for a “repeat player” that distinctly benefits them over a “single-shot” 
claimant.197
In direct contrast to the Wall Street Journal’s praise of the CFPB 
rule’s repeal, the Times lamented that “[b]y defeating the rule, Republicans 
are dismantling a major effort of the Consumer Financial Protection Bu-
reau . . . in the aftermath of the mortgage mess.”198 The paper opined that 
companies like “‘Wells Fargo and Equifax remain free to break the law 
without fear of legal blowback from their customers,’” and that the repeal 
erased any progress made by the agency and its extensive research.199 In
the end, The Times shared the sentiments of Senator Sherrod Brown of 
Ohio: “‘By voting to take rights away from customers . . . the Senate voted 
tonight to side with Wells Fargo lobbyists over the people we serve.’”200
In short, while some parties are content with maintaining the current 
regime dominated by individual arbitrations, many others see it as a threat 
to individuals’ ability to seek cogent redress. Per these sources, businesses 





197. Id.; see Lisa Bingham, supra note 190 at 223–29. 
198. Jessica Silver-Greenberg, Consumer Bureau Loses Fight to Allow More Class-Action Suits,
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selves from liability, and subject plaintiffs to a forum of reparation that is 
stacked against them. These parties call for reform. Part IV addresses the 
changes some institutions have advanced in the hopes of cultivating this 
reform.
IV: LEGISLATING AND REGULATING PAST THE PROBLEMS OF CLASS 
ARBITRATION PRE-EMPTION
Two governmental institutions—the U.S. Congress and the CFPB—
have proposed corrections that would augment claimants’ rights against 
commercial entities that seek to enforce arbitration provisions and class 
action waivers.201 Part IV first addresses proposed legislation put forth by 
Congress, moves on to examine the CFPB’s attempts to regulate class ac-
tion waivers/arbitration agreements in the financial contexts, and concludes 
with this Note’s offer of a solution to the alleged problem.
Looking at congressional action on arbitration agreements, one can 
see that our august legislature has progressed . . . slowly; meaningful feder-
al legislation has not so much as made it out of committee, though one 
cannot fault the House for lacking effort. Since 2007, Congressman Henry 
C. “Hank” Johnson Jr. of Georgia and Senator Patrick Leahy of Vermont 
have biannually introduced two bills: the Arbitration Fairness Act and the 
Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act (“RSRISA”). 
This legislation, if enacted, would render pre-dispute arbitration agree-
ments in several contractual contexts (i.e.—disputes arising out of antitrust, 
civil rights, consumer, or employment) invalid and unenforceable.202
Moreover, with each re-introduction, the bill has received more supporters 
(the latest version of the bill garnered over 75 co-sponsors).203 However,
two problems plague the Arbitration Fairness Act’s passing Congress.
First, some of the bills introduced before Congress contains sweeping 
language that nullifies all pre-dispute arbitration agreements, even those 
where arbitration might serve as the more advantageous mechanism to 
201. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2015, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. (2015); Restoring Statutory Rights 
and Interests of the States Act of 2017, S. 550, 115th Cong. § 3 (2017); Restoring Statutory Rights and 
Interests of the States Act of 2015, S. 2506, 114th Cong. § 3 (2016); Restoring Statutory Rights and 
Interests of the States Act of 2015, H.R. 4899, 114th Cong. § 3 (2016), 
https://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/114/s2506/text [https://perma.cc/44WN-AUW5]; Press Release, 
CFPB Proposes Prohibiting Mandatory Arbitration Clauses that Deny Groups of Consumers their Day 
in Court (May 5, 2016), https://www.consumerfinance.gov/about-us/newsroom/consumer-financial-
protection-bureau-proposes-prohibiting-mandatory-arbitration-clauses-deny-groups-consumers-their-
day-court/ [https://perma.cc/576C-3NLH].
202. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017); Arbitration Fairness Act of 
2015, H.R. 2087, 114th Cong. (2015).
203. Arbitration Fairness Act of 2017, H.R. 1374, 115th Cong. (2017).
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resolve disputes.204 It also has the propensity to hinder arbitration on a 
business-to-business level. If the legislation made it out of committee, its 
language would trigger stark lobbying efforts from the commercial sector 
to defeat it, as it would foreclose not only class arbitration, but virtually all 
arbitration (unless the parties agree to post-dispute arbitration, an arbitral 
form that borders on pure fantasy). This poses a problem, as arbitration in 
the B2B context serves as a pragmatic approach to dispute resolution. By 
painting in such broad brushstrokes, the arbitration-curbing RSRISA bill in 
particular sets itself up for failure, or, at the very least, a sure-fire path to a 
cumbersome congressional conference committee.
Second, the bill attracts no bipartisan support, as its sponsor and co-
sponsors are unanimously Democrats.205 Unless the Democratic Party re-
gains control of both congressional chambers, or the bill draws conserva-
tive backing, the two bills, as currently drafted, has about as good a chance 
of getting out of its congressional holding pen as Ted Kaczynski does from 
Supermax.206
What of the Senate? Well, whereas the lower chamber attempted to 
sprint for the idealistic, Olympic gold medal of arbitral policy, the upper 
chamber’s legislation is more measured. In early 2016, Senator Patrick 
Leahy introduced the Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States 
Act of 2016, a bill that would add an exception to Section 2 of the FAA.207
The proposed bill re-labels Section 2’s original text as Sub-section (a) to 
make it read like so:
(a) In general.—Except as provided in subsection (b), a written provision 
in any maritime transaction or a contract evidencing a transaction involv-
ing commerce to settle by arbitration a controversy thereafter arising out 
of such contract or transaction, or the refusal to perform the whole or any 
part thereof, or an agreement in writing to submit to arbitration an exist-
ing controversy arising out of such a contract, transaction, or refusal, 
shall be valid, irrevocable, and enforceable, save upon such grounds as 
exist at law or in equity for the revocation of any contract.208
A proposed sub-section, (b), states:
Subsection (a) shall not apply to a written provision that requires arbitra-
tion of a claim for damages or injunctive relief brought by an individual 
or small business concern (as defined in section 3 of the Small Business 
Act (15 U.S.C. 632)), in either an individual or representative capacity, 
204. Id.
205. Id.
206. See ADX Florence, WIKIPEDIA, https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/ADX_Florence (last visited 
March 6, 2016).
207. Restoring Statutory Rights and Interests of the States Act of 2017, S. 550, 115th Cong. § 3
(2017).
208. Id.
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arising from the alleged violation of a Federal or State statute, the Con-
stitution of the United States, or a constitution of a State, unless the writ-
ten agreement to arbitrate is entered into by both parties after the claim 
has arisen and pertains solely to an existing claim.209
The Senate bill strikes at the heart of the arbitration clause/class action 
waiver problem. Like the Arbitration Fairness Act, the Senate bill would 
render arbitration provisions unenforceable.210 However, the bill diverges 
from its House counterpart by broadening the exception’s scope to any 
contractual context (not just disputes deriving from the employment, anti-
trust, or consumer realms). Simultaneously, the bill narrows the exception’s 
purview to individuals or small businesses pursuing claims “in either an 
individual or representative capacity” (emphasis added), thereby address-
ing the problem of class arbitration and focusing the bill’s purpose on spe-
cific parties (unlike the House bill, which abrogates arbitration clauses 
generally).
This bill would clearly apply only to individuals and small businesses, 
not to large commercial entities, and thereby would preserve large busi-
nesses’ ability to arbitrate disputes arising in the B2B market. Further, the 
exception emulates the alleged commercial spirit of the FAA. Most im-
portantly, the bill satisfies Concepcion’s and Italian Colors’ requirement 
for a “contrary congressional command” when removing certain claimants 
from Section 2’s grasp. Sadly, just like the Arbitration Fairness Act, Sena-
tor Leahy’s bill died when the 114th Congress adjourned sine die.211
Not all hope is lost; those gunning for reform might find it in the 
fourth “branch” of government: the administrative agencies. Indeed, when 
a group of state attorneys general sought just such reform, they penned a 
letter to the CFPB, advising the agency to consider the rulemaking process 
as a means of stopping the proliferation of contractually induced individual 
arbitration.212 CFPB Director Richard Cordray fulfilled this request a year 
later, and in late 2015 submitted a regulatory proposal addressing the issue 
of class arbitrations in consumer finance.213 His agency echoed those con-
209. Id.
210. Id.
211. Govtrack gives the bill a poor prognosis. Factoring in several variables, the website estimated 
that the bill has a three percent chance of getting out of committee, and only a 7% chance of the entire 
Congress passing it. Idealistic indeed. Id.
212. Letter from Joseph R. Biden III, Delaware Attorney General, and other Attorneys General, to 
Richard Cordray, Director, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau (Nov. 19, 2014), 
http://www.attorneygeneral.delaware.gov/documents/20141119-
AGs_Ltr_to_CFPB_re_Arb_Clauses_Final.pdf [https://perma.cc/7R5J-WXJJ]. 
213. Press Release, Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, supra note 201.
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cerns already floated by scholars and the New York Times. Asymmetric 
bargaining power. Procedural inequities mislabeled as “streamlines.” Plain-
tiffs abandoning claims when they do not amount to a value worthy of pur-
suit.
The CFPB outlined a regulation that would render contracts contain-
ing arbitration clauses and class waivers temporarily unenforceable, until a 
proposed class had the opportunity to attempt certification in court.214 If the 
court denied certification, then the regulation would reinstate the provi-
sions, and claimants could pursue relief via individual arbitration. But, if 
the court granted certification, then presumably the class action would con-
tinue in litigation. Amidst some opposition, the brunt of which came from 
the Chamber of Commerce,215 the CFPB proceeded with its various pro-
posals, and came up with a final rule in May 2016.216
Experts initially predicted that commercial actors will challenge any 
regulation on grounds that Dodd-Frank did not indicate a “contrary con-
gressional command” to abrogate arbitration.217 However, now that Presi-
dent Trump signed a congressional resolution repealing the rule, the 
regulation died a far less painful albeit equally poignant death.
Without agency-by-agency legislation providing arbitration-reforming 
congressional mandates, or a Court willing to radically overturn Italian
Colors’ recent precedent, proponents of the CFPB-like regulation must face 
an elephant in the room: if claimants are looking for comprehensive, 
across-the-board reform for arbitration agreements and class action waiv-
ers, then the agencies cannot achieve such grandeur. Congress limits agen-
cies regulatory jurisdiction to certain statutory contexts; in the CFPB’s 
case, these included fields like fair lending, debt collection, mortgage orig-
ination and servicing, and foreclosure relief. And while the CFPB still has 
reformative teeth—and can take a second bite at advancing a rule similar to 
the one killed off by Congress and the President—many agencies remains 
feckless to effect change in civil rights, employment, corporate derivative, 
and antitrust actions. Advocates of unilateral revision can look only to 
214. Consumer Financial Protection Bureau, Small Business Advisory Review Panel For
Potential Rulemaking on Arbitration Agreements Outline of Proposals under Consideration and Alter-
natives Considered (Oct. 7, 2015), http://files.consumerfinance.gov/f/201510_cfpb_small-business-
review-panel-packet-explaining-the-proposal-under-consideration.pdf [https://perma.cc/D7G4-KWNH].
215. Letter from David Hirschmann, President and Chief Executive Officer, U.S. Chamber of 
Commerce Center for Capital Markets Competitiveness, and Lisa A. Rickard, President, U.S. Chamber 
Institute for Legal Reform, to Monica Jackson, Executive Secretary, Consumer Financial Protection 
Bureau (Dec. 11, 2013), http://www.instituteforlegalreform.com/uploads/sites/1/2013_12.11_CFPB_-
_arbitration_cover_letter.pdf [https://perma.cc/G5XD-L88X].
216. 12 C.F.R. § 1040 (2016).
217. Carter & Pierce, supra note 165.
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Congress to correct the Court’s blunders. In turn, federal legislators can 
rectify “the problem” several ways.
Senator Leahy’s proposed legislation affords claimants meaningful re-
form. As noted above, the bill is just broad enough to cover the parties 
most affected by class action waivers and arbitration clauses, yet narrow 
enough not to contravene the FAA’s commercial purpose. More important-
ly, the bill would fulfill one of the fundamental goals of tort law—
deterrence.218 Allowing individuals to aggregate their actions into a collec-
tive lump sum prevents the “claim chilling” that occurs in individual arbi-
tration,219 and should signal that a company needs to reexamine the safety 
and efficacy of a particular product, service, or practice.
As articulated above, the lack of bipartisan support behind Senator 
Leahy’s bill dooms it to the Senate Judiciary Committee’s recycle bins. 
Nevertheless, a quick tweak could cause conservatives to give this bill an-
other look-over: an exception that insulates small businesses from having 
their arbitration agreements and class action waivers nullified.
The policy perspectives behind this exception are sound. First, unlike 
the NASDAQ’s middle market companies or the New York Stock Ex-
change’s ensconced corporate Colossuses, a small business faced with liti-
gating a class action may confront a “bet the company” suit. While such 
suits can fulfill their deterrent and compensatory goals, many people find it 
viscerally upsetting220 that negative value suits kill off companies that 
might evolve into the next Tesla or Netflix.
The small business exception would preserve mandatory arbitration 
provisions and class waivers for those companies that fall under the Small 
Business Act’s scope. Plaintiffs with meritorious and sizeable claims still 
could arbitrate, and small businesses could receive some breathing room to 
make mistakes without risking their existence. Obviously, as soon as a 
small business fails to meet the definition of the Small Business Act, the 
company would move under the jurisdiction of the Senate bill, and the bill 
would nullify the company’s arbitration clauses and class waivers for cer-
tain claimants.
The exception could take a different form, one not focused as much on 
a distinction between small and large businesses, but more on the quantity 
218. An effect that, as noted in Part III, often goes unanalyzed in the context of individual arbitra-
tions. See Part III, infra.
219. Carter & Pierce, supra note 165.
220. Part of this is likens to the romanticized American Dream where one can start from nothing, 
open a small business, and then grow it into an empire rivaling that of Rockefeller, Gates, and Morgan. 
See Copland, supra note 172.
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of plaintiffs suing and the aggregate amount in controversy. Such an excep-
tion would stem from the Class Action Fairness Act (“CAFA”).221
To provide an overview, as a means of fostering federal adjudication 
of class actions, the CAFA changes 28 U.S.C. Section 1332(a)’s diversity 
jurisdiction requirements. Section 1332(a), as interpreted, mandates com-
plete diversity between plaintiffs and defendants and $75,000 in controver-
sy exclusive of interest and costs.222 In turn, the CAFA requires that 
plaintiffs’ class must comprise of at least 100 claimants, the class must 
meet minimal diversity standards (meaning that at least one plaintiff’s citi-
zenship must differ from at least one defendant’s citizenship), and the 
class’s aggregate damages must exceed $5,000,000.223
If a class meets the CAFA’s three requirements, then each respective 
plaintiff’s arbitration provision would be rendered temporarily unenforcea-
ble. Unrestrained by this provision, a plaintiffs’ class would have the free-
dom to seek certification in federal court. How would a plaintiff know that 
others like her have similar claims? Well, if a plaintiff’s attorney felt that 
their client’s claim might be one that could mushroom into a class action, 
the attorney could petition the arbitrator to stay the proceeding pending 
further investigation. Here, the burden would fall on law firms to research 
the breadth of potential claims relegated to arbitration, and advertise to see 
if one plaintiff’s claim broadens to the level of a class action that meets the 
CAFA requirements. If a firm’s research and advertising led to a potential-
ly viable class maintainable, then, under this exception, the statute would 
render these plaintiffs’ arbitration provisions unenforceable and the firm 
could try to amass a class for certification.
On the other hand, the bill’s drafters could model it to mirror the 
CFPB’s regulation, allow small businesses and individuals an attempt to 
get a class certified, and then reinstate the arbitration provision and class 
waiver once a court has denied certification to the proposed class. Such an 
amendment would mollify those who fear that the bill would blatantly cir-
cumvent parties’ freedom to contract. While businesses still would face the 
threat of having their contractual provisions nullified, the suggested 
amendment would not categorically remove arbitration provisions and class 
waivers as the current House or Senate bills do. It also might satisfy those 
individuals who believe that claimants fare better in individual arbitration. 
Once a class was decertified, the consumer would pursue her claim in an 
environment that supposedly benefits her. Yes, under this method, negative 
221. Class Action Fairness Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-2, 119 Stat. 4 (2005).
222. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a) (2012).
223. Id. § 1332(d).
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value claims could get snuffed out, and yes, this amendment would bear a
Darwinian patina. To put it crassly, the strong, more meritorious claims 
might separate from their weaker, negative value counterparts, with the 
“wheat” proceeding to arbitration and the “chaff” being discarded.
Indeed, each of these suggestions carries its own detractions. The first 
exception that insulates small businesses from liability clearly discrimi-
nates against larger commercial entities. The second exception that re-
volves around the CAFA requirements could extend the arbitral process 
(through the proposed stay) to a potentially untenable length that would 
reduce its efficiency. It also would require law firms to gamble with adver-
tising budgets and other resources in the hopes of aggregating a class ac-
tion. And both the second and the third exceptions—the latter of which 
applies the CFPB’s proposed regulation on a broader level—have the pro-
pensity to snuff out negative value claims if a class does not get certified, 
and force those plaintiffs to arbitrate individually. Nevertheless, if Con-
gress enacted any of these provisions, at least claimants could not complain 
that they were foreclosed from litigating, or that the legal landscape was 
stacked completely against them. And at this point, perhaps some reform, 
even reform that takes baby steps in changing the Court’s jurisprudence, 
would be more desirable than nothing.
V. CONCLUSION
Corporations view the gap in bargaining power between themselves 
and individuals as an opportunity to engage in an arbitrage of the law. With 
each edit, law firms strengthen arbitration provisions to survive courts’ 
skeptical analyses and handcuff claimants to an arbitrator’s largely unre-
viewable and peripherally biased decision. Academics have called for—and 
legislators have attempted to enact—reform that smoothens arbitration’s 
pro-defendant procedures by either rendering class action waivers and arbi-
tration provisions unenforceable, or temporarily unenforceable. However, 
congressional Democrats have not garnered sufficient support from either 
their fellow conservative lawmakers or their constituents to go forward 
with the reforms.
The most disturbing part of individual arbitrations’ effects is how few 
people recognize that the provisions existentially threaten the civil lawsuit. 
Perhaps these people simply have no preference whether they can litigate 
or arbitrate a problem. I doubt that, though, given how few people actually 
know their contracts contain clauses requiring arbitration and waiving class 
actions. It is only when aggrieved claimants seek to bring an action on be-
half of themselves and a group of others that they realize, in almost Nie-
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möller-like fashion224, that there is little they can do to challenge the 
clause—that it is too late. As a stepping-stone, then, advocates for change 
must better disseminate their calls for reform before concocting solutions 
devoid of public input.
Perhaps this is why I find the New York Times and Wall Street Jour-
nal articles crucial; a continued media debate may act as the optimal medi-
um through which the seeds of change can take root. An informed public 
could create the groundswell necessary to pass needed legislation, or to 
have large businesses abandon these clauses altogether. Unlike Fitzpatrick, 
I remain hopeful that the system will change. With some luck, the next time 
I am standing in line at Costco trying to buy that new iPhone X, I can 
watch a chameleon hunt for its lunch without listening to an automated 
voice blab about arbitration. But like that chameleon, I’ll have to wait just a 
little longer.
224. See United States Holocaust Memorial Museum, Martin Niemöller: “First They Came for the 
Socialists . . . ,” HOLOCAUST ENCYCLOPEDIA, http://www.ushmm.org/wlc/en/article.php? Modu-
leId=10007392 [https://perma.cc/3AGF-493X] (“First they came for the Socialists, and I did not speak 
out—Because I was not a Socialist. Then they came for the Trade Unionists, and I did not speak out—
Because I was not a Trade Unionist. Then they came for the Jews, and I did not speak out—Because I 
was not a Jew. Then they came for me—and there was no one left to speak for me.”).
